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Expectations on corporate boards are on the rise, and directors who are experts in the company’s home domain
are, understandably, in high demand. Because those experts can more fully grasp all the ins and outs of difficult
decisions, organisations with more experts in their boards should in principle perform better. The more experts, the
better, common sense might suggest. And this might seem especially true in uncertain periods, when expert
judgment is particularly valuable. But are there also negative effects of expert-heavy boards? That’s the question we
set out to answer in our research on boards of directors of community banks. Though there is a large literature on
professional diversity in decision-making teams, little is known about the impact of expert-heavy boards.
Through our analysis of thousands of banks over more than a decade, we found that boards with a high proportion
of domain experts are generally neither better nor worse than boards with few experts. But when facing uncertainty,
expert-heavy boards are actually more likely to hurt the chances of an organisation to survive. Our research
suggests that this non-intuitive finding may be due to three factors that undermine the effectiveness of expert-heavy
boards, especially in uncertain contexts: (1) cognitive entrenchment, (2) overconfidence, and (3) the suppression of
alternative views.
First, cognitive entrenchment refers to the habits and beliefs that experts develop during their long experience in
their fields. When experts join other experts in decision-making teams, cognitive entrenchment tends to become
accentuated. This means that team members may be more fixed in their professional perspective and less willing to
incorporate other views or new information. CEOs and other directors we interviewed spoke of the “baggage” that
comes from prior banking experience. They also described the mental patterns that prevented expert-heavy teams
from looking at a situation “with fresh eyes.” Organisations operating in uncertain conditions may discover the hard
way that flexibility is critical at those times.
Second, too often, experts are overconfident in the accuracy of their own projections, especially when surrounded
by other experts in decision-making teams. Overconfidence can be contagious in teams, leading them to potentially
discount certain risks. As one CEO put it, “If I got a board which has got a lot of bankers on it, they are going to tend
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to reach for loans a little bit more because they believe that they have got a little bit more background and
experience. Whereas other people who aren’t bankers tend to be a little more cautious.” Among expert directors, we
found a strong belief that “almost every deal is doable.” Sometimes, as an expert director put it, “the market is not
willing [to provide a loan], but you do because you know better.” Failing to appreciate the gravity of certain risks
could be lethal when a firm enters a volatile period.
Third, there might not be enough task conflict on boards with many domain experts. Task conflict is the extent to
which directors express different viewpoints, ideas, and opinions about the decisions they face. Some amount of
task conflict is essential because it allows the board to explore and discuss more alternatives. But research
suggests that a high proportion of domain experts can suppress task conflict because directors may defer too much
to the judgment of experts. CEOs we interviewed noted that when some directors had “massive banking
experience,” non-experts had too much respect for them, and they did not “really call each other out.” An absence of
task conflict can be especially damaging during periods of uncertainty, when divergent views are especially critical.
That’s what we found in our longitudinal analysis of the board composition and survival chances of 1,307 banks
between 1996 and 2012. In the full sample of banks, there was no clear relationship between the proportion of
domain experts in a board and bank survival. But for banks that faced high levels of uncertainty, having a high
proportion of domain expert directors meant a higher chance of bank failure. So, under uncertainty, the more
banking experts on the board, the greater the likelihood that a bank would go out of business.
Building on prior research and our interviews, we focused on three conditions under which banks should experience
greater uncertainty: (1) rapid asset growth, (2) operations in unusual loan markets with atypical, heterogeneous
clients, and (3) intense competition in local markets. Under these conditions, bank boards were especially
vulnerable to the dark side of expertise.
To put these findings in perspective, most boards in our sample had at least two banking experts (out of ten directors
on average). Thus our results do not imply that domain experts should be avoided. Rather, our findings suggest that
domain experts should be balanced by experts in other professional fields—especially when organisations face
significant uncertainty.
It’s also worth noting that a board with a high concentration of domain experts is not the same as a board with little
professional diversity. The concepts involved are distinct. For example, a board of a bank with five bankers, three
lawyers, and two physicians is just as diverse overall (in terms of professional backgrounds) as another bank with
two bankers, five lawyers and three physicians. But these two bank boards are very different in the proportion of
domain expert directors. The former has five domain experts (out of ten directors); the latter has only two.
This is one of the first studies exploring the possible negative impact of domain expertise in decision-making teams.
We hope other studies will continue to shed light on the conditions under which accumulating expertise in decision-
making teams may backfire.
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Notes:
This blog post is based on the authors’ paper When Experts Become Liabilities: Domain Experts on Boards
and Organizational Failure, in Academy of Management Journal, August 1, 2016 vol. 59 no. 4 1124-1149
The post gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
Before commenting, please read our Comment Policy.
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